This study examined whether worktime control buffered the impact of worktime demands on work-family interference (WFI), using data from 2,377 workers from various sectors of industry in The Netherlands. We distinguished among three types of worktime demands: time spent on work according to one's contract (contractual hours), the number of hours spent on overtime work (overtime hours), and the number of hours spent on commuting (commuting hours). Regarding worktime control, a distinction was made between having control over days off and (...) vacations (leave control) and having control over starting and finishing times (flextime). These three worktime demands were expected to have separate as well as joint effects on WFI, whereas worktime control should buffer these adverse effects of worktime demands on WFI. Stepwise regression analyses showed that working high numbers of contractual and overtime hours was indeed associated with high WFI. Further, worktime control indeed made a difference in terms of WFI: whereas leave control contributed directly to lower WFI, flextime buffered the adverse effects of long contractual workhours. Our results suggest that very long working days should be prevented, and that worktime control may be a powerful tool to help workers maintaining a good work-family balance. (shrink)

Thirty-two years ago W. V. Quine proposed a definition of 'logical truth' that has been widely repeated and reprinted. Quine himself seems to have recognized that this definition is wrong in detail; in section 1 we eliminate this fault. What has perhaps been less widely observed is that, in abandoning the model-theoretic account of logical truth in favor of a "substitutional" account, Quine's definition swells the ranks of the logical truths and makes the classification of a sentence as a logical (...) truth dependent both on the interpretation of its extralogical words and on the extralogical vocabulary available in the language. (shrink)

Gert H. Müller The growth of the number of publications in almost all scientific areas,· as in the area of (mathematical) logic, is taken as a sign of our scientifically minded culture, but it also has a terrifying aspect. In addition, given the rapidly growing sophistica tion, specialization and hence subdivision of logic, researchers, students and teachers may have a hard time getting an overview ofthe existing literature, partic ularly if they do not have an extensive library available in their (...) neighbourhood: they simply do not even know what to ask for! More specifically, if someone vaguely knows that something vaguely connected with his interests exists some where in the literature, he may not be able to find it even by searching through the publications scattered in the review journals. Answering this challenge was and is the central motivation for compiling this Bibliography. The Bibliography comprises (presently) the following six volumes (listed with the corresponding Editors): I. Classical Logic W. Rautenberg II. Non-c1assical Logics W. Rautenberg IH. Model Theory H. -D. Ebbinghaus IV. Recursion Theory P. G. Hinman V. Set Theory A. R. Blass VI. ProofTheory; Constructive Mathematics J. E. Kister; D. van Dalen & A. S. Troelstra. (shrink)

A result of Soare and Stob asserts that for any non-recursive r.e. setC, there exists a r.e.[C] setA such thatA⊕C is not of r.e. degree. A setY is called [of]m-REA (m-REA[C] [degree] iff it is [Turing equivalent to] the result of applyingm-many iterated ‘hops’ to the empty set (toC), where a hop is any function of the formX→X ⊕W e X . The cited result is the special casem=0,n=1 of our Theorem. Form=0,1, and any (m+1)-REA setC, ifC is not ofm-REA (...) degree, then for alln there exists an-r.e.[C] setA such thatA ⊕C is not of (m+n)-REA degree. We conjecture that this holds also form≥2. (shrink)

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...) of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM – whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part 1 of this article took up the first two questions. Part 2 took up the second two questions. Part 3 now deals with Questions 5 & 6. Question 5 confronts the issue of utility, whether the manual design of DSM-III and IV favors clinicians or researchers, and what that means for DSM-5. Our final question, Question 6, takes up a concluding issue, whether the acknowledged problems with the earlier DSMs warrants a significant overhaul of DSM-5 and future manuals. As in Parts 1 & 2 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances. (shrink)